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Two Masters

by Carl E. Schneider

A

merican government rests on
the principle of distrust of government. Not only is power
within the federal government checked
and balanced. Power is divided between
the federal government and the state
governments. So what if a state law
conflicts with a federal law? The Constitution says that the "Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States ...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
... any Thing in the ... Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Sometimes the conflict between
federal and state law is obvious and the
Supremacy Clause is easily applied. But
sometimes ...
Diana Levine received an intramuscular injection of Demerol for her migraine headache and of Phenergan-an
antihistamine made by Wyeth-for her
nausea. 1 She soon returned "complaining of 'intractable' migraines, 'terrible
pain,' inability to 'bear light or sound,'
sleeplessness, [and] hours-long spasms
of 'retching' and 'vomiting."' A physician's assistant gave her both drugs
again, this time intravenously. The PA
had a choice between "the 'IV-push'
method, whereby the drug is injected
directly into a patient's vein, or the 'IVdrip' method, whereby the drug is introduced into a saline solution in a
hanging intravenous bag and slowly descends through a catheter inserted in a
patient's vein."
Phenergan is corrosive and causes
gangrene if it enters an artery. The danger is greater with IV push because the
needle may penetrate an artery or the
drug may escape "from the vein into
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surrounding tissue" (perivascular extravasation) and contact arterial blood.
Phenergan's label had "at least six separate warnings" about this. The label said
that "[t]he preferred parenteral
route of administration is by deep
intramuscular injection." If an intramuscular injection is ineffective,
then "it is usually preferable to inject [Phenergan] through the tubing of an intravenous infusion set
that is known to be functioning
satisfactorily. Finally, if for whatever reason a medical professional
chooses to use IV push, he or she is
on notice that 'INADVERTENT
INTRA-ARTERIAL
INJECTION CAN RESULT IN GANGRENE OF THE AFFECTED
EXTREMITY."'
Intravenous injections are often
given in the crook of the elbow (the antecubital fossa), but that is "a universally recognized high-risk area for inadvertent intra-arterial injections" because
arteries there may be in unpredictable
places. The Lippincott Manual of Nursing Practice warns, "in a red-text
'NURSING ALERT,' that the antecubital fossa is 'not recommended' for administering gangerous drugs, 'due to
the potential for extravasation."' And
thus the Phenergan label said:
Due to the close proximity of arteries and veins in the areas most
commonly used for intravenous injection, extreme care should be exercised to avoid perivascular extravasation or inadvertent intra-ar-

terial injection. Reports compatible
with inadvertent intra-arterial injection of Phenergan Injection,
usually in conjunction with other
drugs intended for intravenous use,
suggest that pain, severe chemical
irritation, severe spasm of distal
vessels, and resultant gangrene requiring amputation are likely
under such circumstances.
Nevertheless, to help Levine m a
swift and timely way,'' the PA "pushed a
double dose of the drug into an antecubital artery over ... '[p]robably about
three to four minutes,'" even though
Levine complained of a burning sensation she later said was '"one of the most
extreme pains that I've ever felt.'" Asked
"why she ignored Phenergan's label and
failed to stop" after Levine complained
of burning pains, the PA "explained
that it would have been 'just crazy' to
'worr[y] about an [intra-arterial] injection' under the circumstances." The PA
also said '"[i]t never crossed my mind"'
that an antecubital injection could hit
an artery. It '"just wasn't something that
I was aware of at the time.'"
As the Phenergan label had warned,
gangrene set in, and Levine's forearm
had to be amputated. She sued the doctor, the PA, and the health center for
malpractice. Those claims were settled,
and the doctor and the PA agreed to
testifY for Levine in a suit against
Wyeth. That suit alleged that the Phenergan "labeling was defective because it
failed to instruct clinicians to use the
IV-drip method of intravenous administration instead of the higher risk IVpush method." And it alleged "that
Phenergan is not reasonably safe for intravenous administration because the
foreseeable risks of gangrene and loss of
limb are great in relation to the drug's
therapeutic benefits.''
The jury "found that Wyeth was
negligent, that Phenergan was a defective product as a result of inadequate
warnings and instructions, and that no
intervening cause had broken the causal
connection between the product defects
and the plaintiff's injury.'' It awarded
$7.4 million in damages.
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The federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requires a company seeking
Food and Drug Administration approval of a new drug to propose a label
describing the drug and its use. The
FDA may approve the drug only if it is
safe and effective for use as labeled.
("Label" is misleading. The label is a
sheet or pamphlet that can run many
pages. Its primary audience is medical
personnel, not the user.)
So the FDA-a federal agency-had
decided (repeatedly over half a century)
that Phenergan was safe and effective as
labeled. A state's courts had held Wyeth
liable because the label's warnings were
insufficient. The basic issue, as the
Supreme Court's majority put it, was
whether recognizing "Levine's state tort
action creates an unacceptable 'obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress' . . . because it substitutes a lay
jury's decision about drug labeling for
the expert judgment of the FDA."
Wyeth thought so. It said "the
FDCA establishes both a floor and a
ceiling for drug regulation: Once the
FDA has approved a drug's label, a state
law verdict may not deem the label inadequate .... "The majority, however,
thought Congress had not intended the
FDCA to preempt state action. "Congress enacted the FDCA to bolster consumer protection against harmful products." Congress "may have recognized
that state law remedies further consumer protection by motivating manufacturers to produce safe and effective
drugs and to give adequate warnings."
The dissent noted that the FDA itself had said that the FDCA sets "both a
'floor' and a 'ceiling,"' so that "FDA approval of labeling ... preempts conflicting or contrary State law." The majority
acknowledged that agencies "have a
unique understanding of the statutes
they administer." But the FDA's opinion was "entitled to no weight," partly
because it "reverse[d] the FDA's own
longstanding position without providing a reasoned explanation."
The legal argument in WJ!eth was
about Supremacy Clause jurisprudence
and is too complex and technical to
summarize here. But underlying the
10

legal arguments were conflicting assumptions about regulating drugs.
First, the majority apparently assumed that the FDA's job is to protect
consumers from harmful drugs. On this
view, state restrictions on drugs promote the federal goal of preventing
drugs from injuring consumers. The
dissent, however, apparently assumed
that the FDA can err in either direction-that consumers need protection
from harmful drugs, but also that overprotection can deny consumers drugs
that are, on balance, worth the risk.
Second, the majority evidently assumed that state-court decisions obliging manufacturers to add warnings to
labels do little harm-that more information can only help. The dissent,
however, said that the PA had "disregarded at least six separate warnings that
are already on Phenergan's labeling, so
respondent [Levine] would be hard
pressed to prove that a seventh would
have made a difference." The dissent
also may have believed that there can be
too much disclosure-that the longer
and knottier the disclosure, the less likely it is to be read and the harder it is to
decipher.
Third, the majority and the dissent
may have thought differently about institutional competence. The majority
emphasized the jury's role as the (nearly)
dispositive finder of facts. The dissent
said that "juries tend to focus on the
risk of a particular product's design or
warning label that arguably contributed
to a particular plaintiff's injury, not on
the overall benefits of that design or
label." Juries only see people who have
"already suffered a tragic accident,"
while "patients who reaped those benefits are not represented in court." The
FDA, in contrast, can "consider the interests of all potential users of a drug."
WJ!eth is like many judicial opinions
of bioethical interest. It affects medical
policy-here regulating drugs. Assumptions about medical policy influence judicial thinking. But the issue is not
medical policy, the briefs and oral arguments barely address it, the judges have
no particular understanding of it or particular competence to make it, and the

case has precedential consequences in
unrelated areas of law.
This haphazard way of making medical policy is comprehensible only if we
recall the federal system of checks and
balances. The Supreme Court isn't supposed to make medical policy; here it's
supposed to decide who may make it.
After WJ!eth, states may demand more
restrictive labeling requirements than
the FDA has imposed. But Congress is
free-should it wish to, should it overcome legislative obstacles, and should it
secure the president's signature-to
enact a statute preempting that authority.
Furthermore, if the FDA goes
through a formal and burdensome
process-instead of more casually asserting its opinion in the preamble of a
regulation-it may be able to preempt
that authority as well (unless the president or Congress objects or the courts
find some legal defect with its work).
Meanwhile, the FDA has tried another tactic. Its press release says that
the drug "first went on the market in
1956" and that the "FDA has reviewed
the published literature and post-marketing adverse event reports." The FDA
is not requiring that the label say that
(as Levine had alleged) the drug "is not
reasonably safe for intravenous administration." Rather, the FDA is requiring
manufacturers to include "a boxed
warning" that "will highlight the risk of
serious tissue injury when this drug is
administered incorrectly."
The FDA may thus have strengthened its warning, but it has affirmed its
belief that IV administration should be
permitted. Does this FDA ruling preempt contrary state law? Wyeth's counsel in WJ!eth thinks so. But until the
issue is litigated, we cannot know.
No wonder Justice Frankfurter once
said that "[a] constitutional democracy
like ours is perhaps the most difficult of
man's social arrangements to manage
successfully."
1. Unless otherwise noted, all facts and quotations are from one of the four opinions in
WJeth v. Levine, 129 S Ct 1187 (2009).
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